Since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated. From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having "aggressors" as the third party. From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety. As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). That suggests "SSN" which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and trade controls on nuclear-related items. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called "SSST" in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards.
Introduction
In order to prevent uncontrolled radiation of nuclear energy damaging to human community or being used as threat for political reason, various preventive measures have been taken in peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Major areas for such preventive measures are nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards.
Nuclear safety and safeguards have been implemented from the beginning of nuclear energy development. As for nuclear safety, health damage by radiation was recognized from the early stage of nuclear energy development, and the countries involved introduced various safety measures. One of the missions of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) founded in 1957 is to offer assistance for safety regulation by its member countries.
As for safeguards, countries which want to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are required to be watched not to convert their capacity for military purposes since nuclear energy development started originally for the military purpose of producing atomic bombs. The primary reason to found IAEA was to watch out military conversion, rather than the abovementioned assistance for nuclear safety. With the foundation of IAEA, the international safeguards system was established. Additionally, supplier countries of nuclear fuels extend safeguards to its customer countries by bilateral agreements and, in some region, regional organizations apply safeguards to member countries.
Nuclear security is a relatively new area compared with nuclear safety and safeguards. The practice to use the word "nuclear security" to cover various related measures was established after entering to the 21st century. Though the meaning of nuclear security has not been fully established as a new area, it roughly includes physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, anti-smuggling of nuclear related items, and physical protection of radiation sources (Kurihara, 2003) .
Thus, since the beginning of this century, the so-called 3Ss (Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Security and Safeguards) have become major regulatory areas for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The importance of the 3Ss is now emphasized to countries which are newly introducing nuclear power generation. However, as role models for those newcomers, existing nuclear power countries are also required to strengthen their regulatory infrastructure for the 3Ss. Countries interested in nuclear power development, regardless newcomers or existing, are required to be familiar with the 3S trichotomy instead of the traditional dichotomy of safety and safeguards.
However, the interrelationship between nuclear safety, nuclear security and safeguards is not so clear. Originally, physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities has been a major tool for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons along with safeguards. The more international society becomes interested in nuclear security, the more the clarification is needed for relationship between nuclear security and existing nuclear safety or safeguards. In order to rationalize the allocation of regulatory resources, interrelationship of the 3Ss should be investigated.
This paper investigate interrelationship of the 3Ss mainly on their "prevention" aspect from the ex ante point of views.
Difference in Subjects
From the viewpoint of the number of the parties concerned in regulation, nuclear security is peculiar with having "aggressors" as the third party. Terrorists and other unlawful entities may be such aggressors to nuclear operation. Existing nuclear safety and safeguards are similar as bilateral problem between "nuclear operator" and "regulatory body", though their main purpose is quite different: prevention of accidents in peaceful utilization of nuclear energy for the former and prevention of conversion from peaceful utilization to military utilization in the latter. Some argue that safeguards include detection and deterrence of military conversion by the third party. However, main target of safeguards is still nuclear operators.
Nuclear safety includes voluntary activities for safety by nuclear operators themselves without any intervention by regulatory body. Regulatory body in safeguards includes international, regional and/or foreign regulators along with domestic regulator. Therefore, subjects appearing in each area do not totally identical between nuclear safety and safeguards. Nevertheless, these two areas are similar to be a closed arena for operators and regulators within nuclear energy system. The appearance of the third party in nuclear security is quite unique in comparison with nuclear safety and safeguards. Figure 1 shows difference in subjects between nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security. As for subjects, nuclear safety and safeguards are largely similar as bilateral problem between regulatory body and nuclear operator. Thus, the two areas are demarcated by dotted line. On the other hand, nuclear security is different from these two areas as trilateral problem between regulatory body, nuclear operator and aggressor. Therefore, nuclear security is separated by solid line.
Difference in Purposes
From the viewpoint of final goal of regulation, nuclear security in general and safeguards share the goal of preventing non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy, though the goal of anti-sabotage within nuclear security is rather similar to nuclear safety.
As mentioned in 1. INTRODUCTION, physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities, which is now the major subcategory for nuclear safety, is similar to safeguards in aiming at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Anti-smuggling of nuclear related items, another subcategory of nuclear security, is also aiming at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Remaining subcategories of nuclear security, physical protection of radiation sources, is intended for preventing proliferation of not nuclear weapons themselves but radiological weapons (so-called "dirty bombs".) In general, the final goal of nuclear security is to prevent conversion from peaceful uses to non-peaceful uses (including military uses) of nuclear energy.
However, if closely observed, anti-sabotage within physical protection also contributes to prevention of accidents in nuclear operation just like nuclear safety. Though the final goal of anti-sabotage is to prevent social unrest caused by sabotage which is a part of non-peaceful use (or abuse) of nuclear energy, direct purpose of the activity is to secure normal (in other word, "safe") operation of nuclear facilities, which are similar to nuclear safety. Figure 2 shows difference in purposes as well as subjects between nuclear safety, safeguards and nuclear security. As for purposes, anti-sabotage within nuclear security and nuclear safety has the purpose of preventing nuclear accidents in common. Thus, they are neighboring in the figure (In order to do so, the positions of nuclear security and safeguards are changed). They are demarcated by dotted line in the column of purpose. Anti-sabotage also shares the goal of prevention of non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy with other subcategories of nuclear security. Prevention of non-peaceful uses includes prevention of conversion to military use which is the goal for safeguards. Thus, nuclear security is close to safeguards in purposes and they are demarcated by dotted line in the column of purposes in 
Difference in Causes
Though anti-sabotage is similar to nuclear safety in their purpose of securing normal operation of nuclear facilities as mentioned in 3. Difference in Purposes, it is needless to say that causes of accidents which threaten normal operation are different in each area.
While nuclear safety tries to prevent accidents originated from mistakes or negligence by nuclear operators, anti-sabotage tries to prevent accidents originated from the third party aggressors. That becomes clear by IAEA's introduction of its activity for nuclear safety as to "protect nuclear installations and transport against sabotage and other malicious acts". "Malicious" in this context is called "intentional" or "by mens rea (Latin for "guilty mind")" in legal terms.
In criminal law, it is strictly argued whether some undesirable result is caused by mens rea or negligence, since criminal law punishes the cases by mens rea in principle and the case by negligence only exceptionally. Though there are several theories of criminal law interpretation in Japan, the majority distinguishes "willful negligence" or dolus eventualis and "reckless disregard". While willful negligence is to predict the likelihood of illegal and harmful results and also to admit the results, reckless disregard is to predict the result but not to admit them. The majority interprets willful negligence should be included into mens rea and reckless disregard should be classified into negligence.
As emphasized in 2. Difference in Subjects, while only regulatory body and nuclear operator appear in nuclear safety and safeguards, the third party also appear in nuclear security. And while nuclear safety copes with negligence of nuclear operator, anti-sabotage within nuclear security cope with mens rea of aggressor. Since the subjects are different in both cases, the boundary between negligence and mens rea usually does not have significant meaning. However, it is noteworthy that, if insider problem in nuclear security is taken into account, the boundary between negligence and mens rea decides the boundary between nuclear safety and nuclear security.
Insider Problem
Within subjects, aggressor can be a person, but regulatory body and nuclear operator are organizations as a matter of fact, which include more than one person. Insider means Insider problem itself is difficult task in nuclear security. In addition, existence of insider problem complicates the boundary between nuclear security and nuclear safety and also between nuclear security and safeguards.
As insiders are members of nuclear operator, their sabotage is a kind of internal threat just like in the case of nuclear safety. The difference between anti-sabotage to insiders and nuclear safety is the cause: the former copes with insiders' mens rea, but the latter copes with negligence of members of nuclear operator. However, if negligence of the members is reckless regards, it is very close to mens rea. Moreover, if their mental condition is willful negligence, it will be seemed as mens rea, which falls in the area of nuclear security.
For example, if employees of nuclear operator recklessly operate a nuclear plant with predicting the likelihood of accidents but without admitting the occurrence of accidents and finally cause an accident, the case is caused by reckless disregard to be coped with by nuclear safety. However, if the employees admit the occurrence of accidents and finally cause an accident, the case is caused by willful negligence to be coped with by nuclear security. However, it is difficult to judge whether the employees had admitted the occurrence of accidents or not. Though such a case has never reported in nuclear facilities, border cases between reckless disregard and willful negligence might have occurred in aircraft accidents or railway accidents.
In case of theft of nuclear materials, if aggressors hide their intention to thieve nuclear materials and infiltrate to organization of nuclear operator, it is a matter of nuclear safety. On the other hand, if the employees of nuclear operator intend to thieve nuclear materials with some reason, it is a matter of safeguards to detect and prevent such intention. In other words, the case in which the employees intend theft before employment is a matter of nuclear security, and the case in which they intend after employment is a matter of safeguards. However, it should be difficult to judge when the intention of employees is formed. In practice, these cases are not distinguishable each other. protection) and nuclear safety or safeguards due to insider problem and the boundary issue of negligence and mens rea. In the column of subject, wavy line between nuclear safety and anti-sabotage means that insider problem makes the border between them ambiguous. Similarly, wavy line between safeguards and anti-theft means that insider problem also makes the border between them ambiguous.
These ambiguities are rather theoretical. However, it is still worth to bear in mind that boundaries of the 3Ss are not so clear and marginal cases may cause difficult legal questions.
Flaws of the 3S Trichotomy
As often recognized, safeguards are representative of various policy tools for nuclear non-proliferation. Strictly speaking, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes (nuclear safety and nuclear security). Therefore, Safeguards in the 3Ss are sometimes described as "Safeguards (Non-proliferation)". Even with such complicated description, using same three initial letters of "S" has been impressive enough to emphasize the necessity of regulatory activities for national governments, especially for those of developing countries which are about to be embarked on nuclear energy development.
Nevertheless, it is inconvenient to line up concepts of different natures. The first inconvenience is that trade control (especially export control) of nuclear-related items, another important policy tool for nuclear non-proliferation, tends to be neglected. If safeguards are too much emphasized to developing countries, the necessity of trade controls may be forgotten by them, resulting in proliferation of nuclear weapons by trade through developing countries.
The second but more serious inconvenience is that the overlapping of policy tools and the overlapping of policy purposes tend to be confused since safeguards and trade controls are required not only for non-proliferation but also for nuclear security. States' systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials (SSAC) has been an important component of safeguards. In addition SSAC are nowadays expected to serve to tighten nuclear security by detecting theft of nuclear material by non-governmental entities. In trade control, anti-smuggling of nuclear-related items becomes a part of measures for nuclear security. It is noteworthy that not only export control but also import control is important from the viewpoint of nuclear security. Illegally imported nuclear material or radiation sources can be used by aggressors as threatening tools.
These overlapping mean not overlapping of non-proliferation and nuclear security as policy purposes but overlapping of policy tools for each policy purpose. Non-proliferation which deters national governments from converting peaceful use of nuclear energy to military use is different from nuclear security which prevents non-peaceful use or abuse of nuclear energy by non-national entities. They do not overlap except for ambiguous boundary issue caused by insider problem.
Using safeguards as synonymous with non-proliferation may make government officials of developing countries mistake overlapping in policy tool level for overlapping in policy purpose level. When the abovementioned theoretical problem of ambiguous boundary issues are also taken into account, it will be quite difficult for them to consistently understand regulatory systems for nuclear energy.
New Trichotomy of "SSN"
In order to rationalize each regulatory activity, it is better to survey more comprehensive system for nuclear regulation. As mentioned above, it is not safeguards as a policy tool but nuclear non-proliferation as a policy purpose that should be parallel to other policy purposes. That suggests "SSN" which stands for Safety, Security and Non-proliferation is a better abbreviation rather than 3Ss. From the view point of policy purposes, the "SSN" should be kept in mind to design and review nuclear regulation.
Safeguards as a policy tool should be enumerated along with nuclear safety regulation, nuclear security measures and nuclear-related trade controls. Trade controls have been playing an important role for nuclear non-proliferation. These policy tools can be called "SSST" in which Trade controls are also emphasized along with Safety regulation, Security measures and Safeguards. If the continuity in interest in the 3Ss is regarded as important, "SSST" or "3S & T", which is slightly changed from 3Ss, can be used as the next best thing.
Based upon the "SSN" trichotomy or the "SSST" concept, nuclear regulatory activities can be classified as follows in comparison with the classification by the traditional dichotomy of nuclear safety and non-proliferation. However, this one-dimensional lineup cannot clearly show increasing interests in radiation sources in the process of forming nuclear security concepts. Moreover, the above lineup can not visibly indicate overlapping of policy tools. In order to show change in nuclear regulatory systems with clearly indicating overlapping of policy tools, Fig.4 represents a two-dimensional diagram of nuclear regulatory systems.
Conclusions
This paper examined the 3Ss concept and analyzed interrelationship between the 3Ss. That examination resulted in pointing out its fundamental flaws and redefining the concept as the new trichonomy of "SSN".
Recently, it becomes quite difficult to clearly demarcate policy tools for nuclear regulation. As nuclear security concept is expanding, the denotation of nuclear security measures is also expanding. Nuclear security measures are more and more overlapping with measures for non-proliferation including safeguards and trade controls. Such situation should be clarified in order to design better regulatory systems, especially for nuclear security regulation. The "SSN" trichonomy will serve to clarify complicated situation in In this paper, the purposes of the 3Ss' activities are mainly focused on "prevention" from the ex ante viewpoint. The subsequent paper will investigate the 3Ss, especially nuclear safety and nuclear security, from the ex post viewpoint including "mitigation" purposes of the 3Ss' activities.
